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1. Introduction
Why some nations are rich and others are poor is perhaps one of the
oldest and most fundamental questions in economics. In 1996, the per
capita income of the country at the 90th percentile of the world income
distribution was more than 30 times higher than the country at the 10th
percentile. The persistence of such diﬀerences is surprising in light of the
increasing integration of goods and financial markets in the post-war pe-
riod. Economists have pointed to a number of factors which may have
prevented these income diﬀerences from being arbitraged away, including
institutional ineﬀectiveness, sluggish technology diﬀusion and endowment
disadvantages.1
A more recent line of research has highlighted the potential importance
of trade costs in reducing per capita income.2 These trade costs include
not only the expense of physically moving products between locations but
also all information, communication, monitoring and policy (e.g. tariﬀ)
costs associated with transacting at a distance. Because firms located in
remote locations pay greater trade costs on both their sales to final markets
and their purchases of imported intermediate inputs, they have less value
added available to remunerate domestic factors of production.
In this paper we focus on an additional penalty of remoteness. We
demonstrate that being located on the economic periphery can reduce the
return to skill, thereby reducing incentives for investment in human capital
accumulation. This penalty magnifies the eﬀect that economic geography
can have on cross-country per capita income; increasing a country’s relative
trade costs not only reduces contemporaneous factor rewards, but also low-
ers gross domestic product by suppressing human capital accumulation and
1Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) and Leamer et al. (1999), for example, analyse the
eﬀect of institutions and resource endowments on educational attainment in Latin Amer-
ica. Studies examining the links between human capital, development, and growth in-
clude Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Bils and Klenow (2000), Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa
(2001), G alor and M ou ntford (2001) and M ankiw et al. (1992).
2See, in particular, Hanson (1998) and Redding and Venables (2001). For early analy-
ses of trade costs, geography and per capita income, see Gallup et al. (1998, 2000),
Hummels (1995), Leamer (1997), and Radelet and Sachs (1998). This paper focuses on
economic geography (the lo cation of econ om ic agents relative to one another in space)
rather than physical geography (e.g. climate and disease, see Gallup et al. 1998, 2000).
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decreasing the supply of high-income skilled workers.3 This result emerges
from an extension of the standard two-sector (agriculture and manufac-
turing) Fujita et al. (1999) economic geography model to allow unskilled
individuals to endogenously choose whether to invest in education. Our
framework shows how the distribution of world economic activity has im-
portant implications for incentives to acquire skills. We believe this eﬀect
of economic geography to be important and largely neglected in the existing
literature.4
The paper reports three main theoretical results. First, we show that
countries located further from global economic activity have a lower skill
premium if manufactured goods are relatively skill intensive and face rela-
tively large trade costs. The intuition for this result can be conveyed via
the well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem: increased remoteness has the
same eﬀect as a reduction in the relative price of the manufactured good.
Because manufacturing is relatively skill intense, the relative wage of skilled
workers — and the incentive to educate — falls.
Second, we demonstrate that this result is robust to more general as-
sumptions regarding trade costs. In particular, because of input-output
linkages and increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, remoteness re-
duces incentives to accumulate skill even if relative trade costs in manu-
facturing are lower.5 Input-output linkages are important because trade
costs must be paid on both imported intermediates and exported output,
with the result that even relatively small trade costs can be magnified into
a large share of value added. Increasing returns to scale, on the other
hand, mean that proximity to large markets becomes especially important.
Firms that are remote from large markets have to charge a lower price net
of trade costs in order to exp ort suﬃcient quantity to cover fix d c osts. A s
a result, the equilibrium skill premium depends upon both physical remote-
ness (i.e. bilateral trade costs) and economic remoteness (i.e. the spatial
3A wide range of empirical studies for developed and developing countries provide
evidence that skilled or e ducated wo rkers receive higher wages (se e Psacharop o ulos, 1994).
4Our analysis focuses on the relationship between the existing location of economic
activity and incentives to acquire skills. We do not explain the historical factors leading,
for example, to the emergence of Western Europe as a center of world economic activity.
5Bernar d et al. (2002), for exam ple, show that while U S tariﬀ s a re higher for skill-
intensive manufactures (e.g. Electronics), freight and insurance costs are higher for bulk
commodities (e.g. Food).
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distribution of economic activity).
Third, we show how our model can be used to formalize the role of a
number of other determinants of human capital investment, including agri-
cultural productivity and technology. We demonstrate that higher agricul-
tural productivity (or, more generally, an abundance of natural resources)
hinders manufacturing development and reduces incentives to invest in hu-
man capital. We also show that a transfer of manufacturing technology
from developed to developing countries not only raises output per capita
directly but also has a positive indirect eﬀect through induced human cap-
ital accumulation. In general, the indirect eﬀect will not be internalized
by private sector agents, and the existence of this pecuniary externality
provides a potential rationale for policies designed to accelerate technology
transfer.
While the main focus of the paper is theoretical, we exploit structural
relationships from the model to provide empirical evidence that countries
located far from centers of world economic activity are characterized by
relatively low levels of educational attainment. We also provide evidence
that the world’s most peripheral countries are becoming relatively more
remote from global economic activity over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 outline the theoretical
model and explore the relationship between remoteness and equilibrium in-
vestments in skill. Section 4 extends the analysis to allow for a more general
specification of trade costs. Section 5 examines the role of other determi-
nants of human capital investments. Sections 6 and 7 use the structure
of the model to derive empirical measures of market access and examine
the link between market access and educational attainment. Section 8
concludes.
2. Theoretical Model: Geography and Skill Acquisition
This paper builds upon existing theoretical research on new economic
geography as synthesized in Fujita et al. (1999).6 We extend the stan-
6See also Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1990, 1995), and Venables (1996).
In the interests of tractability, much of this literature has assumed a single factor of pro-
duction, labor. Recent research by Amiti (2001) and Strauss-Kahn (2001) has introduced
considerations of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory into this framework by endowing coun-
tries with exogenous quantities of multiple factors of production.
Distance, Skill Deepening, and Development 5
dard economic geography model by introducing endogenous human capital
accumulation. The analysis emphasizes the importance of the interplay
between increasing returns to scale, transport costs, input-output linkages,
and human capital investments.7 We derive predictions for the relation-
ship between remoteness, international trade, human capital investment,
and levels of per capita income.
2.1. Preferences and Endowments
The world consists of i ∈ {1, ..., R} countries. Each country is endowed
with a mass of L¯i consumers. Consumers have one unit of labour which
is supplied inelastically with zero disutility. This unit of labour begins
in an unskilled state, but individuals choose endogenously whether or not
to invest in becoming skilled. Consumer preferences are identical and ho-
mothetic, and are defined over consumption of a homogenous agricultural
good and a variety of diﬀerentiated manufacturing goods. For simplicity,
the utility function is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form,
Uj = A
(1−µ)
j M
µ
j , 0 < µ < 1 (1)
whe re A denotes consumption of t he homogeneous agricultural go o d and
M corresponds to a consumption index of diﬀerentiated manufacturing va-
rieties. Going forward, we use j to denote a country that is demanding or
importing a good and i to denote a country that is producing or exporting
a good. The consumption index of diﬀerentiated varieties takes the form
Mj =
" RX
i=1
Z ni
0
mCij(z)
(σ−1)/σdz
#σ/(σ−1)
=
" RX
i=1
ni
¡
mCij
¢(σ−1)/σ#σ/(σ−1)
 (2)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing va-
rieties and the second equation exploits the fact that, in the equilibrium
established below, all products produced in a country i are demanded by
country j in the same quantity. As a result, we dispense with the index z
7 In terms of M arshall’s (1920) three forces of agglom eration (a p o ole d m arket f r
specialized skills, input-output linkages, and knowledge spillovers), our analysis focuses
on input-output linkages. For a model of agglomeration emphasizing search frictions
in the labour market, see Amiti and Pissarides (2002), while Mori and Turrini (2002)
emphasize complementarities between product variety, product quality, and skills.
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and rewrite the integral as a product. ni denotes the number of varieties
produced in country i andmCij denotes the amount of each variety produced
in country i for final consumption in country j.
Dual to the consumption index (Mj) is a manufacturing goods price
index (Gj) defined over the prices of individual varieties produced in i and
sold in j (i.e. pMij ),
Gj =
" RX
i=1
Z ni
0
pMij (z)
1−σdz
#1/(1−σ)
=
" RX
i=1
ni(pMij )
1−σ
#1/(1−σ)
, (3)
where the second equation makes use of the symmetry in equilibrium prices.
2.2. Production Technologies
The homogenous agricultural good is produced under conditions of per-
fect competition with the following constant returns to scale technology,
Yi = θYi (S
Y
i )
φ(LYi )
1−φ, 0 < φ < 1 (4)
where Yi denotes output of the agricultural good; LYi denotes the amount
of unskilled labour allocated to this sector; SYi denotes the skilled labour
allocation; and θYi indexes agricultural productivity.
8
To facilitate comparison of our results with the standard economic ge-
ography model without endogenous human capital investments, we begin
with the conventional assumption that the homogenous agricultural good is
traded at no cost. We relax this assumption below to explore further how
relative trade costs across sectors influence incentives for human capital
accumulation.9
Varieties of manufacturing goods are produced with an increasing re-
turns to scale technology using a composite of primary factors of production
8While not explicitly modelled here, θYi may be thought of as capturing the eﬀects
of endowments of land, other factors of production, and the nature of land holdings on
agricultural productivity. Introducing these other factors of production more explicitly
merely complicates the analysis without adding any insight.
9Our focus is on endogenous human capital investments. Davis (1999) examines
how agricultural trade costs aﬀect the ‘home market eﬀect’, while Venables and Limao
(2002) consider the relationship between relative trade costs across sectors and industrial
structure.
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(skilled and unskilled labour) and the output of all manufacturing goods
(intermediate inputs). The representative country i firm thus faces the
following cost function,
Γi =
¡
wSi
¢α
(wUi )
βG(1−α−β)i ci [F + xi] , (5)
where ci denotes a constant marginal input requirement; ciF is a fixed input
requirement; and xi =
PR
j=1 xij is the total output of the firm produced for
all markets. We assume that the composite of primary factors of production
and intermediate inputs takes the Cobb-Douglas form, where wSi is the
wage of skilled workers (with input share α), wUi is the wage of unskilled
workers (with input share β), and Gi is the price index for manufacturing
goods from equation (3) (with input share (1 − α − β)). The parameter
ci corresponds to an index of technological eﬃciency that may potentially
vary across countries.
We assume trade costs take the iceberg form.10 In order for one unit
of a traded good to arrive in location j from location i, TMij > 1 units must
be shipped. Thus, when TMij = 1 trade is costless, and T
M
ij − 1 measures
the proportion of output lost in shipping from i to j. We assume the
parameter TMij captures all trade costs between locations i and j, including
physical transportation costs, information, communication, and monitoring
costs, tariﬀ barriers and non-tariﬀ barriers.11
2.3. Human Capital Investment
An individual z in country i is endowed with one unit of unskilled
labour, which can be converted into a unit of skilled labour by incurring
a fixed education cost of Ωi(z) units of unskilled labour. Denominating
the education cost in terms of unskilled labour captures the idea that real
resources are used in the process of becoming skilled. As a result, the cost
10We use iceberg trade costs for tractability. All we require is that remote locations
face greater trade costs.
11Hummels (1999) and Limao and Venables (2001) provide evidence on the importance
of transport costs and the role of geography in determining their magnitude. See Leamer
and Storper (2001) and Venables (2001) for a discussion of the continuing and sometimes
increasing importance of location following the introduction of new information and com-
munication technologies such as e-mail and the internet.
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of education is proportional to the unskilled wage, reflecting the higher op-
portunity cost of the real resources used in countries with a higher unskilled
wage (see also Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa 2001).12
The amount of unskilled labour used in becoming skilled depends on two
components: Ωi(z) = hi/a(z). First, the parameter hi captures the eﬀect
of all aspects of the institutional environment and of government policies
that influence the cost of education, where higher values of hi correspond
to a higher cost of education.
Second, an individual’s education cost depends on their ability a(z),
and we assume that high-ability individuals face lower education costs.
This captures the idea that, for example, high-ability individuals have to
work less hard and require fewer educational resources in order to attain a
given level of education. Although we have chosen here to make the costs
of education a function of ability, one could equivalently assume that the
cost of education is the same for all individuals but that the rate of return
varies with ability.13
We assume that there are upper and lower bounds to ability determined
by human biology and that an individual’s ability is drawn from a distri-
bution over the interval [a, a]. The probability density function of ability
is denoted by λ(a), so that the mass of individuals in country i with a
particular level of ability a0 is λ(a0)L¯i. We assume the probability density
function of ability is determined by human biology and is therefore the
same in all countries.
An individual z in country i will choose to become educated if the wage
diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled workers exceeds education costs,
wSi − wUi ≥
hi
a(z)
wUi . (6)
12To keep the theoretical analysis as tractable as possible, we consider a static model
where human capital accumulation requires real resources but does not take time. Intro-
ducing a more explicit dynamic model of skill acquisition would merely complicate the
analysis without changing the key insights of the model.
13 In this alternative specification, the wage wSi in firms’ cost function is the wage per
ability-adjusted (quality-adjusted) unit of skilled labour. An individual z of ability a(z)
receives an actual wage of a(z)wSi . In the alternative formulation, the ability-adjusted
skilled wage is the same for all individuals, but actual wages vary with individual ability.
All of the paper’s results are robust to considering the alternative specification. It is only
necessary to slightly modify the condition for an individual to become skilled in equation
(6) to: a(z)wSi −wUi ≥ hiwUi .
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We assume that the cumulative distribution function of ability Λ(a) =R a
a λ(a)da is continuous and monotonically increasing in ability. That is,
as we consider successively higher and higher levels of ability, there will
be fewer individuals more able than this level. The analysis is compatible
with a wide range of probability density functions for ability. A particularly
tractable case is where ability is uniformly distributed over the interval
[a, a], in which case λ(a) = 1/[a− a].
2.4. General Equilibrium
2.4.1. Consumer Equilibrium
Consumers maximize period-by-period utility subject to their budget
constraint, which specifies that expenditure on manufacturing varieties and
the agricultural good must equal income minus any education cost incurred.
The first-order conditions imply the following demand-side relationship be-
tween the relative price and relative consumption of the two goods,
pYj
Gj
=
1− µ
µ
Mj
Aj
, (7)
where pYj is the price of the agricultural good and Gj is the manufacturing
goods price index from above. Equation (7) determines country j’s con-
sumption of all manufacturing goods (of the consumption indexMj). Final
consumption demand for individual varieties produced in i may be derived
by applying Shepherd’s Lemma to the manufacturing price index (Gj),
mCij = (p
M
ij )
−σ ECj G
σ−1
j , (8)
where ECj denotes total consumer expenditure on manufacturing goods in
country j.
2.4.2. Equilibrium Supply of Skills
The individual’s education decision compares the wage diﬀerential be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers with the costs of education. Equation
(6) implicitly defines a critical value for ability a∗i such that all individuals
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with levels of ability a(z) ≥ a∗i (z∗) choose to become skilled. From above,
this critical value for ability is,
(S) a∗i =
hi¡
wSi /w
U
i − 1
¢ . (9)
The marginal individual with the critical level of ability a∗i is indiﬀerent be-
tween becoming skilled and remaining unskilled, and equation (9) is there-
fore termed the skill indiﬀerence condition (S).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium critical level of ability a∗i above which in-
dividuals become skilled is monotonically decreasing in the relative skilled
wage (wSi /w
U
i ) and monotonically increasing in the cost of education para-
meter (hi)
Proof. Proposition 1 follows immediately from the skill indiﬀerence con-
dition (S).
Intuitively, as the relative wage of skilled workers (wSi /w
U
i ) increases, it
becomes profitable for individuals of lower ability to invest in education. As
the critical level of ability a∗i falls, the equilibrium number of skilled workers
increases and the equilibrium number of unskilled workers decreases. The
equilibrium masses of skilled and unskilled workers are,
Si =
Z a
a∗i
λ(a)L¯ida (10)
Li =
Z a∗i
a
λ(a)L¯ida−
Z a
a∗i
h
a
λ(a)L¯ida (11)
Si + Li +
Z a
a∗i
h
a
λ(a)L¯ida = L¯i (12)
where the second term in equation (11) captures the real resources used in
human capital acquisition.
To provide some intuition for the forces at work in the model, Figure
1 graphs the supply-side relationship between the relative wage and the
critical level of ability above which individuals become skilled (the right-
hand side of equation 9).
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2.4.3. Producer Equilibrium
In the agricultural sector, profit maximization and constant returns to
scale imply that price equals unit costs of production if the agricultural
good is produced,
pYi = 1 =
1
θYi
(wSi )
φ(wUi )
1−φ, (13)
where we choose the agricultural good for the numeraire and hence pYi = 1
for all i. In the manufacturing sector, the representative country i firm
maximizes the following profit function,
πi =
RX
j=1
pMij xij
TMij
−
¡
wSi
¢α
(wUi )
βG(1−α−β)i ci [F + xi] . (14)
The first-order conditions for profit-maximization yield the standard result
that equilibrium prices are a constant mark-up over marginal cost,
pMi =
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶¡
wSi
¢α
(wUi )
βG(1−α−β)i ci, (15)
where pMi = p
M
ij /T
M
ij is the ‘free on board’ or ‘customs’ price charged by
the firm prior to trade costs. Substituting this pricing rule into equation
(14), we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium profit function,
πi =
µ
pMi
σ
¶
[xi − (σ − 1)F ] . (16)
In order to break even in a monopolistically competitive equilibrium, the
firm’s output must equal a constant: x¯ = (σ − 1)F . The price needed to
sell this many units is determined by the firm’s demand function, where
demand consists of the sum of final consumption and intermediate demand
across all markets. A firm in country i will therefore sell the quantity x¯
when it charges a price,14
(pMi )
σ =
µ
1
x¯
¶ RX
j=1
EjG
σ−1
j
¡
TMij
¢1−σ
, (17)
14The transport cost term (Tij) enters with exponent 1 − σ and not σ because total
shipments to market j are Tij times quantities consumed.
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where Ej = ECj +E
I
j denotes total country j expenditure (final consumption
and intermediate) on manufacturing goods.
Combining the expression in equation (17) with the fact that, in equi-
librium, prices are a constant mark-up over marginal cost, we obtain the
following zero-profit condition,
(W)
µ
σ
σ − 1
¡
wSi
¢α
(wUi )
βG(1−α−β)i ci
¶σ
=
µ
1
x¯
¶ RX
j=1
EjG
σ−1
j
¡
TMij
¢1−σ
.(18)
This relationship is termed the wage equation (W). It pins down the max-
imum wages of skilled and unskilled workers that a firm in country i can
aﬀord to pay, given demand for its products (as captured in the summation
on the right-hand side of the equation), and given the cost of intermediate
inputs (as captured in the manufacturing price index on the left-hand side
of the equation).
2.4.4. Market Clearing Conditions
Factors are relatively immobile internationally, and we therefore make
the standard trade theory assumption of factor mobility across sectors
within a country and immobility across countries. General equilibrium
requires that each country’s labour market clears,
SYi + S
M
i = Si (19)
LYi + L
M
i = Li (20)
where {SMi ,L
M
i } and {S
Y
i ,L
Y
i } denote skilled and unskilled employment in
the manufacturing and agricultural sectors respectively. The total sup-
plies of skilled and unskilled labour {Si,Li} are determined according to
equations (10) and (11) above.
In equilibrium, we also require goods markets to clear at the world level,
for manufacturing varieties and the homogeneous agricultural good.
3. Geography and Skill Deepening
The general equilibrium of the model combines consumer optimization,
education optimization, and producer optimization with the market clear-
ing conditions to solve for equilibrium prices, equilibrium expenditures, and
the equilibrium location of production.
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In this section, we use structural equations of the model to characterize
the nature of the relationship between location and incentives to invest
in skills that must hold in general equilibrium. We follow Redding and
Venables (2001) in using the model to derive theory-consistent measures
of a country’s location relative to its markets and sources of supply. We
then go on to demonstrate how market access and supplier access influence
incentives to invest in human capital acquisition.
We begin by combining final consumption demand (from equation 8)
and intermediate demand to obtain an expression for bilateral trade flows
between countries i and j. Expressing this relationship in aggregate value
terms, yields,
(T) nipixij = nip1−σi
¡
TMij
¢1−σ
EjG
σ−1
j . (21)
In this gravity equation (the trade equation, T), bilateral exports depend
on three sets of considerations. First, on a measure of demand in the
importing country j termedmarket capacity (mj ≡ EjGσ−1j ) and comprised
of total expenditure on manufacturing goods in market j (Ej) as well as
the number of competing firms and the prices they charge as summarized
in the manufacturing price index (Gj). Second, on a measure of supply
potential in the exporting country i termed supply capacity (si ≡ nip1−σi )
and comprised of the number of manufacturing firms (ni) together with the
prices they charge (pi). Third, on bilateral trade costs (TMij )
1−σ.
For each exporter i, we may sum market capacities in the importers
it serves, weighting by bilateral trade costs. This yields a measure of the
country’s overall access to markets - market access (MAi),
MAi ≡
RX
j=1
(TMij )
1−σEjG
σ−1
j =
RX
j=1
(TMij )
1−σmj . (22)
Similarly, for each importer j, we may sum supply capacities in the ex-
porters that it receives goods from, weighting by bilateral trade costs. This
yields a measure of the country’s overall access to sources of supply - sup-
plier access (SAj),
SAj ≡
RX
i=1
(TMij )
1−σnip
1−σ
i =
RX
i=1
(TMij )
1−σsi. (23)
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From the trade equation (T), market and supplier access may be con-
structed from information on bilateral trade flows. We now show how the
wage equation (W), which pins down the maximum wages of skilled and
unskilled workers that firms in each location can aﬀord to pay, may be writ-
ten as a function of market and supplier access. Taking the manufacturing
price index over to the right-hand side of (W) and using the definition in
equation (22), we have,¡
wSi
¢α
(wUi )
β = ξ
1
ci
(MAi)
1
σG(α+β−1)i , (24)
where ξ absorbs earlier constants. Now note from equations (3) and (23)
that the manufacturing price index (Gi) may be written as a function of a
country’s supplier access alone,
(P) Gi = [SAi]
1
1−σ . (25)
Combining the expression for the price index (P) with equation (24), the
maximum skilled and unskilled wages that a firm in location i can aﬀord
to pay can be written as,
(W’) (wSi )
α(wUi )
β = ξ
1
ci
(MAi)
1
σ (SAi)
(1−α−β)
(σ−1) . (26)
Intuitively, countries whose locations provide easy access to supplies of
manufacturing goods (a high value of SAi) are characterized by low values
of the manufacturing price index. This itself reduces unit costs of produc-
tion and increases the maximum wages that manufacturing firms in those
locations can aﬀord to pay. If a country’s location also provides easy access
to markets for manufacturing goods (a high value of MAi), this increases
the ‘free on board’ price that manufacturing firms can charge for their prod-
ucts while still selling enough output to cover the fixed costs of production,
thereby again increasing the maximum wages that the firms can aﬀord to
pay.
Consider a country that is incompletely specialized in agriculture and
manufacturing. We establish below the conditions under which this oc-
curs.15 The zero profit conditions in agriculture (13) and manufacturing
15Empirically, countries produce both agriculture and manufacturing. It is straight-
forward to also examine the complete specialization case. With complete specialization
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(26) together implicitly define the equilibrium wages of skilled and un-
skilled workers. Manipulating these zero profit conditions and combining
them with the skill indiﬀerence condition (S), we are able to completely
characterize the equilibrium relationship between geographical location and
endogenous human capital investments.16 Taking logarithms and totally
diﬀerentiating each zero profit condition, we have,
0 = φ
dwSi
wSi
+ (1− φ)dw
U
i
wUi
(27)
α
dwSi
wSi
+ β
dwUi
wUi
=
1
σ
dMAi
MAi
+
(1− α− β)
(σ − 1)
dSAi
SAi
(28)
Proposition 2 Suppose a country becomes more remote in the sense that
equilibrium market and supplier access fall (dMAi/MAi = dSAi/SAi =
−γ < 0). If manufacturing is skill intensive relative to agriculture and
the country remains incompletely specialized, the new equilibrium must be
characterized by a lower relative wage of skilled workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, a fall in market and supplier access in the manufacturing
zero profit condition acts exactly like a fall in the price of the skill-intensive
good in the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory.
A fall in market and supplier access leads to a violation of the manufactur-
ing zero profit condition at initial equilibrium factor prices and results in a
decline in the size of the manufacturing sector. The decline in manufactur-
ing releases relatively more skilled labour than is demanded in agriculture
at initial equilibrium relative factor prices. Hence, at the new equilibrium,
the nominal skilled wage is lower, the nominal unskilled wage is higher (so
in manufacturing, the relative wage will be determined by combining the relative supply
of skilled workers from Proposition 1 with a relative demand relationship derived from
the manufacturing wage equation that depends on market and supplier access.
16 It is relatively straightforward to introduce a non-traded goods sector into the model.
If a country is incompletely specialized in agriculture and manufacturing, the zero profit
conditions for the two traded sectors must hold, pinning down the equilibrium wages of
skilled and unskilled workers. The equilibrium price of the non-traded good would be
determined from its unit cost function at these equilibrium wages.
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that the agricultural zero profit condition continues to be satisfied), and
these together imply that the relative wage of skilled workers is lower.
A lower relative wage of skilled workers unambiguously reduces the
incentive to invest in skills. Hence, as a country’s equilibrium values of
market and supplier access fall, the number of skilled workers falls and the
number of unskilled workers rises.
Proposition 3 Suppose a country becomes more remote in the sense that
equilibrium market and supplier access fall (dMAi/MAi = dSAi/SAi =
−γ < 0). If manufacturing is skill intensive relative to agriculture and
the country remains incompletely specialized, the new equilibrium must be
characterized by:
(a) a higher critical level of ability a∗i above which individuals become skilled
(b) a reduced supply of skilled workers and an increased supply of unskilled
workers
Proof. See Appendix.
Equilibrium relative wages and employment in the two sectors for given
levels of market and supplier access are shown graphically in Figure 2. This
is the direct analogue of the isoprice line representation of equilibrium in the
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model (the dual of the Lerner diagram). The more
steeply-sloped curve is the unit cost function in agriculture, which must
equal price in an equilibrium where agriculture is produced. The more
shallow-sloped curve is the marginal cost function in manufacturing (bi =
(wSi )(w
U
i )G
(1−α−β)
i ci), which is drawn in skilled wage-unskilled wage space
for a given level of market and supplier access. The level of supplier access
pins down the value of the manufacturing price index (Gi = [SAi]
1
1−σ ).
The manufacturing wage equation (W’) implies that, in an equilibrium
where manufacturing goods are produced, marginal costs are proportional
to market access (bi = ξ(MAi)
1
σ ).
A reduction in market and supplier access corresponds to an inward
shift in the manufacturing isoprice line (less value added is available to
remunerate the factors of production). From Figure 2, the new equilibrium
must be characterized by a lower skilled wage and higher unskilled wage.
The manufacturing production technology implies that marginal and
average relative unit factor input requirements are the same. Hence, the
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slope of each isoprice line corresponds to relative employment of skilled and
unskilled labour by a representative firm in that sector. In order for both
manufacturing and agriculture to be produced in equilibrium, we require
that, at the equilibrium relative factor prices (wˆSi , wˆ
U
i ), the slope of a line
indicating the endogenous relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers
(Si, Li) lies in between the tangents to the two isoprice lines.
Skill accumulation may be directly linked to economic development
within the model. National income net of resources used in education is
equal to wSi Si + w
U
i Li where, in equilibrium, w
S
i > w
U
i . The relationship
is particularly clear in the case where agriculture uses only unskilled labour
(φ = 0, which together with our choice of numeraire implies wUi = 1). In-
creases in the skilled wage and, since wSi > w
U
i = 1, increases in Si relative
to Li will unambiguously raise national income.
In the full general equilibrium of the model, market and supplier access
are endogenously determined by the distribution of production and expen-
diture across locations. Propositions 2 and 3 characterize relationships that
hold in the full general equilibrium. They exploit the equilibrium structure
of production and the supply of skills to characterize the relationship be-
tween market access, supplier access, and human capital investments when
countries are incompletely specialized.17 In our empirical work, we use the
trade equation (T) to measure market and supplier access from bilateral
trade data. We take as given the location of production and expenditure,
as revealed by bilateral trade, and examine to what extent cross-country in-
vestments in human capital are consistent with the equilibrium relationship
predicted by the model.
To keep the analysis as clean as possible and to facilitate comparison
with the standard economic geography model, we have so far assumed that
the agricultural good is freely traded. In the next Section, we relax this
assumption.
17Again, note the analogy with the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. In general, relative
goods prices are endogenously determined. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem exploits
the equilibrium structure of production to derive a relationship between relative goods
and relative factor prices when countries are incompletely specialized.
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4. Equilibrium with Trade Costs in Manufacturing and
Agriculture
To introduce agricultural trade costs in as tractable way as possible, we
modify consumers’ utility functions slightly. Specifically, we assume that
each country produces a single diﬀerentiated agricultural good.18 These
diﬀerentiated goods enter a consumption index Aj in equation (1) that
takes the Dixit-Stiglitz form,
Aj =
" RX
i=1
A(σ−1)/σij
#σ/(σ−1)
, σ > 1. (29)
The diﬀerentiation of goods across countries may be interpreted in two
ways, which for our purposes are equivalent. First, there are a number of
diﬀerent agricultural goods (e.g. wheat, corn, barley, maize) which are im-
perfect substitutes for one another, and each country completely specializes
in a diﬀerent agricultural good due to Ricardian diﬀerences in technology
or unmo delled var iation in land endowments (as in Davis, 1997; see also
Dear dorﬀ, 1998 and Krugman and Venables, 2001). Second, there i s Arm-
ington diﬀerentiation by country of origin. The first is the more plausible
interpretation and the one taken here.
In order for one unit of an agricultural good to arrive in location j from
location i, we assume that TAij > 1 units must be shipped, so that T
A
ij−1 is a
measure of agricultural trade costs. With perfect competition and constant
returns to scale, the free on board (fob) price of agricultural goods in each
location i will equal the average cost of production, while the cost inclusive
of freight price (cif) charged in an importing location j will be a mark-up
over average production cost with the size of the mark-up determined by
bilateral trade costs,
pYij
TAij
= pYi =
1
θYi
(wSi )
φ(wUi )
1−φ, (30)
18 It is possible to analyze the role of agricultural trade costs while retaining the as-
sumption that agricultural goods are homogenous. This complicates the analysis because,
with an homogenous product and trade costs, exporters of agriculture will not generally
export to all locations and importers will not generally import from all locations (see
for example Ve nables and L im ao, 2002). As discusse d furth er b elow, one interpretatio n
of the specification here is that countries are specialized in diﬀerent agricultural goods
w h ich a re im p erfec t s ub stitu te s for o ne  an oth er.
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and we choose the cif price of country i’s agricultural good in one location
(for example, j = 1) as the numeraire (so that pYi1 = 1 and p
Y
i = 1/T
A
i1).
The manufacturing zero profit condition (26) continues to depend on
market and supplier access, while agricultural trade costs (TAij ) now enter
directly into the agricultural zero profit condition (30). To examine the
eﬀects of increased remoteness, we again totally diﬀerentiate the two zero
profit conditions, assuming that a country remains incompletely specialized
in agriculture and manufacturing,
−dT
A
i1
TAi1
= φ
dwSi
wSi
+ (1− φ)dw
U
i
wUi
, (31)
α
dwSi
wSi
+ β
dwUi
wUi
=
1
σ
dMAi
MAi
+
(1− α− β)
(σ − 1)
dSAi
SAi
, (32)
where we have used our choice of numeraire (pYi = 1/T
A
i1) and manufactur-
ing is assumed to be skill intensive relative to agriculture (α/β > φ/(1−φ)).
Suppose that the country experiences an equiproportionate increase in
the value of agricultural and manufacturing trade costs to all locations:
dTMij /T
M
ij = dT
A
ij /T
A
ij = γ > 0. The increase in agricultural trade costs
(TAij ) enters directly into the agricultural zero profit condition and directly
shifts the isoprice line for this sector inwards in Figure 2. For given values of
production and expenditure in each location (i.e. for given values of market
capacity, mj , and supply capacity, si), the increase in manufacturing trade
costs (TMij ) reduces market and supplier access (since σ > 1 in equations 22
and 23). As a result, the manufacturing isoprice line also shifts inwards in
Figure 2. Though nominal wages both fall (in terms of the numeraire), the
eﬀect of these shifts on the relative wage — and human capital accumulation
— appears ambiguous.
This analysis yields a number of important insights. When both manu-
facturing and agriculture face trade costs, the eﬀect of increased remoteness
on skill accumulation depends upon both relative skill intensity and relative
trade costs. If, as in Section 3, ad valorem trade costs are more important
in the skill intensive sector, remote locations will experience reduced incen-
tives to invest in skill. However, the same outcome can emerge even if ad
valorem trade costs are lower in the high skill sector because of asymmetries
in the eﬀect of trade costs on agriculture and manufacturing.
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First, even if shipping costs are lower for skill-intensive sectors, other
trade costs, including all search, communication, and monitoring costs, are
likely to be relatively high in these sectors.19
Second, a given level of ad valorem trade costs has a stronger eﬀect
on manufacturing than agriculture because input-output linkages require
firms to incur trade costs on both imported intermediate imports as well
as exported output. Indeed, because intermediate inputs account for a
substantial proportion of costs, even relatively small trade costs can become
large as a proportion of value added.20 The relative importance of trade
costs in manufacturing due to intermediate inputs can be seen by noting
that the change in trade costs enters once in the agricultural zero profit
condition (31) but twice in the manufacturing zero profit condition (32)
via its eﬀect on both market and supplier access.
Third, skill-intensive manufacturing is increasing returns to scale, while
low-skill agriculture is constant returns to scale. The presence of increasing
returns to scale in manufacturing means that market size is important: in
equilibrium, firms must sell enough units of output in order to cover the
fixed costs of production. Hence, trade costs do not enter the manufacturing
zero profit condition (32) directly, but instead enter through market and
supplier access, which respectively weight market size and supply capacity
in all of a country’s trade partners by bilateral trade costs. In agriculture
in contrast, the presence of constant returns to scale means that it is per-
unit trade costs which are important, and these enter directly into the
agricultural zero profit condition.
The importance of this distinction can be seen by holding a country’s
bilateral trade costs constant but moving production and expenditure from
neighboring to distant locations. This will have no eﬀect in the agricultural
zero profit condition where only per unit trade costs matter (equation (31)
19New technologies (e.g. the internet) may reduce trade costs in some skill intensive
sectors. One prominent example is the emergence of Bangalore as a software program-
ming centre in India. See Leamer and Storper (2001) and Venables (2001) for further
discussion of geography and new technologies.
20Consider a stylized example where prices are determined on world markets, inter-
mediate inputs account for 50% of costs and transport costs are borne by the producing
country. Ad valorem trade costs of 10% on both final output and intermediate inputs
reduce domestic value-added by 30%, with the reduction in value-added rising to 60%
for trade costs of 20%. See Radelet and Sachs (1998) for further discussion of this point.
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where dTAij /T
A
ij = 0). However, reducing market and supply capacity at
neighboring locations and increasing them by the same amount at distant
locations (i.e. increasing a country’s economic remoteness rather than its
geographical remoteness) unambiguously reduces a country’s market and
supplier access (i.e. dMAi/MAi < 0 and dSAi/SAi < 0 in the manu-
facturing zero profit condition, equation 32). As in Section 3, the fall in
market and supplier access will unambiguously reduce the relative wage
and equilibrium supply of skilled workers if manufacturing is skill intensive
relative to agriculture.
Fourth, in general equilibrium, changes in agricultural and manufactur-
ing trade costs will themselves influence the distribution of production and
expenditure across locations (of market capacity, mj , and supply capacity,
si), with the resulting changes in economic remoteness influencing the skill
premium and incentives to invest in human capital in the way discussed
above.
The importance of input-output linkages and increasing returns to scale
in skill-intensive manufacturing suggests that our earlier finding that remote
countries have lower incentives to invest in human capital accumulation
carries over to a world where trade costs are paid on both agricultural
and manufacturing goods. The analysis also suggests that reductions in
trade costs in relatively skill-intensive sectors (through, for example, trade
liberalization) may be particularly important in elevating human capital
investments in peripheral countries.
5. Other Determinants of Human Capital Investment
The discussion so far has emphasized the importance of geographical
location for incentives to invest in human capital. In this section, we ex-
amine the eﬀects of changes in other parameters of the model which are
related to potential determinants of human capital investment emphasized
in the existing literature. To isolate the eﬀects of these other variables, we
consider the eﬀect of parameter changes holding constant a country’s mar-
ket and supplier access. We continue to assume countries are incompletely
specialized in agriculture and manufacturing (the conditions for which are
derived above).
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Proposition 4 The critical level of ability a∗i above which individuals be-
come skilled is monotonically increasing and the equilibrium supply of skilled
workers Si is monotonically decreasing in
(a) productivity in agriculture θYi
(b) the cost of manufacturing production parameter ci
(c) the cost of education parameter hi
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, increases in agricultural productivity θYi act like a rise in the
price of the agricultural good. By analogy with the Stolper-Samuelson The-
orem, an increase in agricultural productivity reduces the relative skilled
wage, and hence reduces equilibrium human capital investments. Our the-
oretical framework, therefore, formalizes the idea that a productive agri-
cultural sector or, more generally, an abundance of agricultural land and
other natural resources may both hinder the development of manufacturing
and impede investments in human capital (see for example the analysis of
Latin America in Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997 and Leamer e t al., 1999).
The model also captures the idea that technology and, in particular, the
transfer of technology from advanced countries is important for economic
development. Technology transfer that reduces manufacturing production
costs, ci, raises the maximum skilled and unskilled wage that a manufac-
turing firm in country i can aﬀord to pay given market and supplier access.
In terms of Figure 2, the manufacturing isoprice lines shifts outwards away
from the origin. Since manufacturing is skill intensive relative to agricul-
ture, this increases the relative wage of skilled workers, and hence raises
equilibrium human capital investments.
Thus, there is an important general equilibrium complementarity be-
tween technology and skills. The transfer of technology to skill-intensive
manufacturing industries in developing countries not only directly raises
output per capita but also has positive indirect eﬀects through induced hu-
man capital investment.21 The incentive to transfer technology depends, in
part, on a country’s institutions and policy environment (see for example
Acemoglu e t al., 2001). Hence, the analysis i s c onsistent with an i mp ortant
21See Redding (1996) for an analysis of technology-skill complementarity within indus-
tries in advanced countries.
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eﬀect of institutions on the process of economic development and with a
complementarity between institutions and human capital investment.
Finally, institutions are also important via their eﬀects on the cost of
education parameter, hi. Changes in institutions or government policies
that reduce the costs of education, hi, increase equilibrium investments
in human capital. As the supply of skilled workers rises, output of the
skill-intensive manufacturing sector also rises.
6. Empirical Measurement of Market and Supplier Access
Using bilateral trade flow data compiled by Feenstra et al. (1997),
we construct theoretically consistent measures of market access (MA) and
supplier access (SA) for all countries at five-year intervals from 1970 to
1995 using equations (22) and (23). To ensure that these measures are
not driven by small countries that trade very little with the rest of the
world, we restrict our sample to the 137 countries that trade with at least
5 partners.
From the trade equation (T), the model predicts that bilateral trade
flows depend upon exporting country characteristics (i.e. supply capac-
ity, si ≡ nip1−σi ), importing partner characteristics (i.e. market capacity,
mj ≡ EjGσ−1j ), and bilateral transportation costs (TMij ). We use country
dummy variables (denoted by di and dj , respectively) to capture market
and supply characteristics for each pair of countries i and j. This has the
advantage of controlling for all observed and unobserved variables that af-
fect market and supply capacity.22 The dummy variables also capture any
component of transport costs or trade policy that is common across all of a
particular country’s export partners and import suppliers. We model the
bilateral component of trade costs as depending upon distance (distanceij)
and whether or not two countries share a common border (borderij). Dis-
tance is the great circle distance, in kilometers, between the two countries’
largest cities. Thus, the empirical counterpart of equation (21) is:
ln(Xijt) = δ1t ln(distanceij) + δ2tborderij + ηitdi + ψjtdj + uijt. (33)
22 In particular, the dummies capture the role of the manufacturing price index, Gj .
They control, therefore, for w hat A nderson and van W inco o p (2001) term ‘multilateral
resistance’ (a country’s average trade barrier with all partners).
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for each time period separately. Xijt denotes the value of exports from i to
j at time t; ηit are the coeﬃcients on the exporting country dummies which
capture supply capacity at time t; ψjt are the coeﬃcients on the importing
partner dummies which capture market capacity at time t; and uijt is a
stochastic error.
Table 1 presents the results of estimating this equation on the sample of
non-zero trade flows, by year. The distance and common border variables
have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on either the country dummies or
the partner dummies are equal to zero is easily rejected at conventional
significance levels using a standard F-test, and the model explains over
90% of the cross-sectional variation in bilateral trade flows. The economic
importance of distance appears to grow with time: whereas a 1% increase
in distance is associated with a 1.2% reduction in bilateral exports in 1970,
it is associated with a 1.5% reduction in exports by 1990.
Estimated market access (gMAit) for exporter i and supplier access
(fSAjt) for importer j can be constructed using coeﬃcient estimates from
equation (33) and equations (22) and (23) from Section 3.:
gMAit = X
j 6=i
(distanceij)
bδ1t (exp(borderij))bδ2t (exp(dj))bψjt (34)
fSAjt = X
i6=j
(distanceij)
bδ1t (exp(borderij))bδ2t (exp(di))bηit (35)
A country’s market and supplier access will evolve over time, as the
coeﬃcients on distance and the existence of a common border change, and
as market and supply capacities in its trade partners change as captured in
the time-varying coeﬃcients bψjt and bηit.
Empirically, market and supplier access are highly correlated. As a
result, we use gMAit as a proxy of countries’ distance from world economic
activity in our empirical analysis below. Very similar results are obtained
if fSAjt is used instead.gMAit and fSAjt have a number of advantages compared to traditional
estimates of distance. Most important, they are derived from a general
equilibrium model of international trade that incorporates economic geog-
raphy. Second, they rely upon bilateral trade data to uncover revealed
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access to markets and sources of supply, and are thereby able to incorpo-
rate the eﬀects of unobservable transportation costs, trade barriers, and
determinants of market and supply capacity. Finally, they capture in a
single measure several dimensions of physical distance.
Table 2 rep orts the results of regressing gMAit on countries’ great circle
distance from the US, Japan and Belgium in kilometers. Distance from
these three economic centers explains 90% of the variation in market ac-
cess. Of the three locations, market access is most negatively correlated
with distance from Brussels; coeﬃcient estimates imply that a 1% increase
in a country’s distance from that Brussels reduces market access by 0.77%.
Figure 3 provides a visual representation of this correlation in 1990. No-
table outliers in the figure, including Canada and several Asian countries,
are l o cated near either the US or J apan. Low levels of market access
in, for example, Australia and New Zealand reflect their remoteness from
other markets around the world.
Comparison of the distributions of market access from 1970 to 1995 in-
dicates that peripheral countries are becoming more economically remote
over time. Table 3 reports the ratios of various percentiles of these distrib-
utions at five year intervals and indicates that the distributions are charac-
terized by increasing inequality. All three ratios — 90th/10th, 80th/20th and
75th/25th — increase with time. This trend is interesting in its own right and
worthy of further inquiry. Potential explanations include an increasingly
uneven distribution of market and supply capacities across countries over
time and the rising coeﬃcient on distance in the trade equation estimation.
7. Empirical Relationship Between Geography and
Human Capital
In this section, we check whether the human capital implications of the
model are supported by the data. Consistent with the model, we provide
evidence that educational attainment is higher in countries with greater
market access. Data on educational attainment for a large cross-section of
developed and developing countries in 1990 is available from Barro and Lee
(2001). These data record the percent of each country’s over-15 population
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that has attained secondary and tertiary education. 23 Data on b o th
market access and e ducational attainment are available for approximately
100 countries, dep ending up on the year. More detail on the data used in
this section i s provided in a data App endix.
Table 4 rep orts the results of regressing higher education attainment —
de fined as t he prop ortion of the p opul ation w ho have attained secondary
or tertiary education — on market access for a cross section of countries in
1990. Because the prop ortion of the p opulation w ith higher e ducation i s
b ounded b etwe en 0 and 1, we employ a l ogistic t ransformation:
ln
µ
Higher Education
1−Higher Education
¶
= κ0t + κ1t ln( gMAit ) + εit . (36)
The first column of the table rep orts results of this bivariate regression for
the 105 countries f or which data are available in 1990. The estimated
co eﬃcient on market access is p ositi ve and satistically significant at t he
1% leve l.
The second column of Table 4 show s that t his r elationship i s robust
to restricting attenti on to a s maller set of countries where we have data
on additional cont rol variables The third column of the t able indicates
that market access retains a significant p ositive relationship wi th higher
education e ve n in t he presence of indicators thought to b e imp ortant in
cross count ry studies of deve lopment (e.g. Gallup et al., 1998 and Hall and
Jones, 1999). T he indicators, available from the Cente r f or International
Deve l opment24 , consist of a measure of the risk of expropriation by the
gove rnment, t he p e rcent of count ries’ land that i s t ropical, and dummies
for so cialist rule and external wars. Including these variables in column
(3) reduces the magnitude of the market access co eﬃcient from 0.61 to 0.30
although it remains s tatistically signi ficant at conventional criti cal values.
Among the controls, only risk of expropriati on is statisti cally signi ficant :
greater risk of expropriation is negatively asso ci ated wi th higher education
attainment.25 For comparison, the final three columns of Table 4 report
23For further information, see Barro and L ee (1993), (2001). a
de la Fu ente and Domenech (2000) provid es a com plem entary source of informatio n for O ECD countries.
24http://www.cid.harvard.ed u/
25Similar results are obtained for various definitions of higher education (e.g. just sec-
ondary education attainment) as well as for variations on the additional control variables
used (e.g. d is ta n ce from the eq uato r in place of p erce nt o f tropical land). T h e US,
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similar results when OECD countries are excluded or when geographic dis-
tances from three centers of world economic activity are used in place of
market access.
This paper provides some of the first evidence of a positive correlation
between countries’ human capital investments and measures of access to
centers of world economic activity. Shedding further light on the mech-
anisms behind this correlation is an interesting area for future research.
Potentially fruitful avenues for further inquiry include looking for a sim-
ilar relationship across regions within countries26; analyzing the relation-
ship between changes in educational attainment and changes in market
access within countries and regions; using richer identification strategies
with cross-country and cross-region data (see for example the analysis of
spatial income inequality in Redding and Venables 2001); and exploiting
exogenous changes in market access associated with shifts in policy regime
such as trade liberalization (see for example the analysis of spatial income
inequality and Mexican trade lib eralization in Hanson, 1996).
8. Conclusion
We present a model which ties a country’s human capital accumulation
to its distance from global economic activity. If skill intensive sectors are
relatively trade-cost intensive, feature more pervasive input-output link-
ages, or are characterized by stronger increasing returns to scale, relatively
peripheral countries will experience a lower skill premium and reduced in-
centives to educate their workers. Consistent with the predictions of theory,
we provide empirical evidence that countries with lower market access have
lower levels of educational attainment.
To the extent that human capital accumulation accelerates develop-
ment, our analysis suggests that remoteness impedes income convergence
with developed nations. An obvious policy implication is that periph-
Belgium, and Japan are excluded in columns (2) to (5) to keep the sample size consistent
with results reported in the last two columns. Results in earlier columns are similar if
these three countries are included. All additional results, omitted to conserve space, are
available from the authors upon request.
26Across countries, the model’s assumption of factor immobility is relatively plausible.
Within countries, peripheral regions may also be disadvantaged by the migration of skilled
workers to more central regions (the ‘brain drain’).
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eral countries need to get closer to the center of global economic activity.
Though countries obviously cannot move, and thereby reduce their phys-
ical distance, it is possible to reduce the costs of remoteness. Perhaps
most important in this regard is the need for advanced economies to lower
formal and informal trade barriers to the world’s more isolated economies.
The planned dismantling of the global Multifiber Arrangement in 2005, for
example, is a step in this direction.
Also likely to be important are eﬀorts to reduce transport costs directly
via improvements in infrastructure (e.g. roads, ports, etc.) or the frequency
of port calls by shipping lines. Shipping routes themselves, of course, are
endogenous to economic activity, but there may be a role for developed
countries to subsidize the establishment of such routes as a way of ele-
vating opportunity on the periphery. Further evaluation of these policy
options is needed to identify the relevant market failures and examine how
they compare in cost-benefit terms to other policies, such as subsidizing
education directly.
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A Theory Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From equation (27), the zero profit condition in agriculture implies,
dwUi
wUi
= −
µ
φ
1− φ
¶
dwSi
wSi
(37)
Substituting this expression into the zero profit condition in manufacturing
(28), we have, µ
α− βφ
1− φ
¶
dwSi
wSi
= −
·
1
σ
+
(1− α− β)
(σ − 1)
¸
γ
Note that
µ
α− βφ
1− φ
¶
> 0, ⇐⇒ α
β
>
φ
1− φ
Therefore, if
α
β
>
φ
1− φ
dwSi
wSi
< 0,
dwUi
wUi
> 0,
d(wSi /w
U
i )
wSi /w
U
i
< 0
A2. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (a) follows immediately from Proposition 2 and Proposition 1
(b) follows immediately from the fact that the equilibrium number of skilled
workers is negatively related to the critical level of ability a∗i , while the
equilibrium number of unskilled workers is positively related to a∗i
Si =
Z a
a∗i
λ(a)L¯ida, Li =
Z a∗i
a
λ(a)L¯ida−
Z a
a∗i
hi
a
λ(a)L¯ida
A3. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Proposition 4 is most easily proved combining Figure 2 and the
results in Proposition 1.
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(a) an increase in θYi shifts the agriculture isoprice line in Figure 2 out-
wards. For given values of market and supplier access, which determine the
position of the manufacturing isoprice line, this unambiguously reduces the
relative wage of skilled workers. From Proposition 1, the fall in the rela-
tive wage of skilled workers increases a∗i and hence reduces the equilibrium
supply of skilled workers Si =
R a¯
a∗i
λ(a)L¯ida
(b) an increase in ci shifts the manufacturing isoprice line in Figure 2 in-
wards for given values of market and supplier access. This unambiguously
reduces the relative wage of skilled workers. From Proposition 1, the fall
in the relative wage of skilled workers increases a∗i and hence reduces the
equilibrium supply of skilled workers Si =
R a¯
a∗i
λ(a)L¯ida
(c) following an increase in hi, the agriculture and manufacturing isoprice
lines in Figure 2 are unchanged for given values of market and supplier ac-
cess. Hence, the equilibrium relative wage of skilled workers is unchanged.
For a given relative wage of skilled workers, Proposition 1 implies that an
increase in hi increases a∗i and hence reduces the equilibrium supply of
skilled workers Si =
R a¯
a∗i
λ(a)L¯ida.
B Data Appendix
Bilateral t rade data are f rom Feenstra et al (1997) at five ye a r i nt e r va l s
from 1970-95. To ensure that our results are not driven by small countries
that trade relatively little with the rest of the world, we restrict our sample
to the 137 countries that trade with at least five partners. Distance is
the great circle distance, in km, between two countries’ largest cities using
latitude & longitude coordinates from the Getty Thesaurus of Geographic
Names, http://www.getty.edu/research/tools/vocabulary/tgn/index.html.
Common border information is from the CIA World Factbook:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
Educational attainment data from Barro and Lee (2001). Higher ed-
ucation is defined as the proportion of the over-15 population that has
attained secondary or tertiary education.
Development indicators from Gallup et al (1998) and Hall and Jones
(1999), and include: risk of expropriation by the government, the p er cent of
countries’ land that is tropical, and dummies for socialist rule and external
wars. These data can be downloaded from http://www.cid.harvard.edu.
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1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Regressor ln(X ij ) ln(X ij ) ln(X ij ) ln(X ij ) ln(X ij ) ln(X ij )
ln(distance ij ) -1.18 -1.27 -1.27 -1.33 -1.37 -1.49
-36.98 -39.82 -42.09 -44.83 -49.96 -58.50
ln(border ij ) 0.48 0.41 0.42 0.31 0.42 0.44
2.96 2.85 2.99 2.25 3.27 2.96
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9191 9936 9717 9551 10302 11182
R2 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97
Notes:  Table displays OLS coefficients and T-values based upon Huber-White 
robust standard errors.   Each column represents a regression of bilateral exports on 
distance between partners and whether partners share a common border for the 
noted year.  Regressions include country and partner dummy variables.  
Table 1: Trade Equation Estimation
Regressors
Ln(Distance to US) -0.53 ***
8.22
Ln(Distance to Belgium) -0.77 ***
22.40
Ln(Distance to Japan) -0.70 ***
11.01
Observations (Countries) 137
Adjusted R-squared 0.90
Notes:  Table displays OLS coefficients.  T-values are listed below 
coefficient estimates and are based on Huber-White robust standard 
errors.  See text for definition of Market Access (MA).  ***, ** and 
* signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Results on the included constant are suppressed.
Ln(Market Access)
Table 2: OLS Regression of Market Access on the Physical Distance of
Countries from Three Economic Centers
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Year 75th/25th 80th/20th 90th/10th
1970 2.5 3.4 6.8
1975 2.6 3.5 7.3
1980 2.6 3.7 7.2
1985 2.6 3.8 7.4
1990 2.7 4.2 8.6
1995 2.9 4.2 10.3
Notes:  Table displays the ratio of various percentiles of 
the distribution of Market Access (MA) across countries 
over time.  See text for definition of Market Access.  Each 
year contains 137 country observations.
Ratio of Market Access Percentiles
Table 3: The Relative Distribution of Countries’ Market Access Over Time,
1970 to 1990
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Regressors
ln(Market Access) 0.66 *** 0.61 *** 0.30 ** 0.59 **
5.98 4.32 2.22 2.16
Risk of Expropriation -0.58 *** -0.41 *** -0.56 ***
4.40 3.13 4.44
Percent of Land in Tropics -0.67 -0.55 -0.82
1.18 0.98 1.42
Socialist Rule (1950-1995) 0.28 -0.01 0.33
0.78 0.03 0.94
External War (1960-1985) -0.13 -0.14 -0.14
0.30 0.34 0.31
Ln(Distance to US) -0.65 *** -0.51 ***
2.85 2.73
Ln(Distance to Belgium) -0.29 *** -0.09
3.12 0.92
Ln(Distance to Japan) -0.95 *** -0.55 ***
4.59 3.28
US, Japan and Belgium Excluded
OECD Excluded
Observations (Countries)
Adjusted R2
(3) (4)
66 66 49
(5) (6)
Higher 
Education
Higher 
Education
Higher 
Education
Higher 
Education
Higher 
Education
Higher 
Education
(1) (2)
No
No Yes Yes
Notes:  Table displays OLS coefficients and T-values based upon Huber-White robust standard errors.  Dependent variable is 
a logistic transformation of higher education (i.e. ln(Higher/(1-Higher)), defined as the over 15 year old population share 
attaining secondary or tertiary education.  See text for definition of Market Access (MA).   Risk of Expropriation is a measure 
of a lack of property rights protection and varies from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk).  Data on this measure, the percent of land 
in tropics, and dummies for socialist rule and external war are from the Center for International Development at Harvard 
(http://www.cid.harvard.edu/).  Great circle geographic distance measures, derived from the latitude and longitude co-
ordinates of a country's largest city, are in thousands of kilometers.  ***, ** and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels.  Results on the included constant are suppressed.
66 66
0.23 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.26 0.45
105
YesYes Yes
No No No Yes No
Table 4: OLS Regression of Higher Education Attainment on Market Ac-
cess, 1990
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ā
a
1
ai(z)
wiS / wiU
ai*
(wiS / wiU)*
Figure 1: The supply-side relationship between the critical value of ability
a∗i and the relative wage w
S
i /w
U
i . Only individuals with ability greater
than a∗i become educated given the relative wage (w
S
i /w
U
i )
∗.
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0 wiU
wiS
1=1/θiY(wiS)φ(wiU)1-φ
(wiS)α(wiU)β SA-(1-α-β)/(σ-1) ci =ξMA1/σ
-LiY/SiY
-LiM/SiM
S
iwˆ
U
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Figure 2: Equilibrium skilled wage, unskilled wage, and relative unit factor
input requirements in each sector
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Figure 3: Market Access versus Distance to Belgium, 1990
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